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Between policy and science: research councils’ 
responsiveness in Austria, Norway and  
Switzerland 
Stig Slipersæter, Benedetto Lepori and Michael Dinges 
This paper investigates the developments of research councils in Austria, Norway and Switzerland, and 
analyses their responsiveness to government and science. By use of various data sources and indicators, 
our results suggest that councils are sometimes more responsive to the beneficiaries’ interests (science) 
than to policy-makers, but are more responsive to government policies when under stronger 
government control. Patterns of responsiveness tend to be stable through time despite important 
changes in national contexts and the changing roles and organisation of research councils. These 
findings have interesting theoretical consequences about responsiveness and independence 
ESEARCH COUNCILS have been the pre-
ferred way of institutionalising ‘the second 
stream’ of research funding in most indus-
trialised countries. Both researchers and research  
institutions are perceiving council funding for re-
search projects allocated through research grants, 
programmes and projects as increasingly important 
(Geuna, 2001; Geuna and Martin, 2003). Instru-
ments and criteria are co-decisive for the selection of 
research topics, for researchers’ adaptive strategies 
and their ability to perform high quality research 
(Laudel, 2006), but also because general government 
appropriations often are tied up with the coverage of 
running costs, leaving the institutions with little 
freedom. Funding from intermediaries such as re-
search councils might thus be the only way to make 
possible new research initiatives and thereby scien-
tific development. 
Research councils are in many ways semi-
independent agencies operating at arm’s length from 
government and can often be closely linked to the 
research community. Their loyalty can thus be bi-
directional, and the councils might have to balance 
between the interests of policy-makers and scien-
tists. Our main concern is to analyse how research 
councils act as intermediaries influenced by national 
research policies on one hand and the research 
community on the other. By comparing research 
councils in Austria, Norway and Switzerland, we 
will shed light on the importance of the councils’ 
embeddedness in national contexts and history for 
how they play their roles. 
We first introduce the research questions we are 
posing. Then we discuss the theoretical framework 
underlying our understanding of research councils’ 
actions and responses to policy, before we lay out 
the chosen analytical model and methodology. We 
then present the councils and give empirical evi-
dence on the developments along the selected vari-
ables. Finally, we discuss the findings. 
Research questions 
Research councils play a crucial role in scientific 
development and in science policy in most industrial 
countries and are often assigned the task of allocating 
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large parts of public budgets for science and for im-
plementing science policy. However, a council 
needs also to have some collaboration with scientists 
to fulfil its mission of implementing government 
policies and priorities. Since scientists do not always 
readily accept government policies, a council will 
have to balance the interests of government on the 
one hand, and those of scientists and their institu-
tions on the other, being more or less responsive to 
both parts. 
From this double-sided relationship of the coun-
cils emerges our first question; are councils mainly 
responsive to government or scientists? In its es-
sence, this question concerns the driving forces of 
science (science policy or scientists), but we will 
here be narrower in focus and concentrate on how 
responsive research councils are to science policy. 
Responsiveness is dependent on several factors, 
among them the councils’ autonomy (dependent on 
the national traditions of governance), the mission or 
profile of a council and how science policy is co-
ordinated horizontally internally in the council and 
between councils. Applying a set of variables to ana-
lyse responsiveness, we assume that the eventual 
evidence for a council being highly responsive to 
policy initiatives actually indicates that policy-
makers have some steering capacities towards  
science. 
Secondly, we are interested in assessing national 
variations by investigating the question whether  
research councils have developed along national  
trajectories or whether there are homogeneous  
developments across the compared countries.  
Homogenous developments will indicate some  
general trends in science policy, while disparate  
developments indicate that science policy is mainly 
a national enterprise. 
Theoretical approaches 
To be able to study the development of research 
councils and their roles, we need a flexible approach 
accounting for the complex relationships between a 
council and its surroundings. Research councils 
might maintain several roles, depending on the parts 
of the research system they address and the purpose 
of the actions they initiate. 
Towards the scientific community, a council’s 
main role will normally be as a funding agency for 
research projects, but it might also serve as a devel-
oper of research policy through choice of instru-
ments, priority areas and its selection mechanisms. 
Towards policy-makers, it will act as an agency im-
plementing policies, but might also have its own 
agenda of increasing public budgets for research or 
the implementation of specific strategies and 
schemes for targeted fields of research, the construc-
tion of research facilities, and so on. Thus most 
councils maintain more roles than as an agent for the 
government, and consequently a council’s actions 
will be dependent on its relationships with more than 
one part and on its ability to fulfil more than one 
type of task. 
Principal–agent approach 
Various aspects of science policy and the relation-
ships between institutions of science have often been 
analysed over the last ten years by use of principal–
agent theories (Guston, 1996; van der Meulen, 1998; 
Braun, 2003; Braun and Guston, 2003; Caswill, 
2003; van der Meulen, 2003; Gulbrandsen, 2005). 
Principal–agent theory normally assumes an asym-
metrical relationship between principal and agent; 
the principal is hiring the agent to contribute to the 
achievement of the principal’s goals (Petersen, 
1993). This approach can be applied to science pol-
icy and the relationships between institutions in the 
scientific system at several levels and in a hierarchy 
of relationships (Guston, 1996) but, in our context, 
we use the model for explaining the relationships be-
tween government and council on the one hand, and 
council and the institutions of science on the other. 
Several analyses have used principal–agent theory 
for analysing research councils’ double relationship 
towards government and scientists (for instance, 
Caswill, 2003; van der Meulen, 2003; Gulbrandsen, 
2005). These approaches analyse research councils 
as agents for government in the government’s efforts 
to realise science policy goals. The relationship is 
asymmetrical, since government is contracting the 
council and the council is dependent on government 
allocating the necessary resources and legal author-
ity empowering the council to perform the actions 
deemed necessary to fulfil its part of the contract. 
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The relationship is, however, not completely 
asymmetrical, since government cannot terminate 
the contract without inflicting large costs and con-
siderable political debate, because normally there is 
no more than one council for each scientific domain 
in a country, often less. The asymmetry in the rela-
tionship will also be modified by the relationship  
between the council and the scientific community, a 
relationship consisting of several elements. First, a 
council needs to evoke the necessary interest in sci-
entists to apply for the support schemes it provides 
(Arnold, 2004). This is usually no problem as scien-
tists will be eager to apply for funding. Still the  
research council will have to rely heavily on contact 
with scientists to be sure their programmes and in-
struments are in accordance with actual and potential 
developments of science. 
Secondly, a council will normally engage scien-
tists on boards and committees at various levels de-
ciding the use and design of instruments, on 
selection committees, and on the council board. 
Third, councils often recruit senior officials and 
leaders from scientific positions. In total, this makes 
strong connections and dependencies between the 
council and the scientific community. In addition, 
councils often take the role as advocates for the in-
terests of science, by promoting arguments for  
increased science budgets, the need for new efforts 
in certain scientific fields or for infrastructures. 
The relationship can also be completely reversed, 
as government will be dependent on scientists to de-
velop its science policy (Braun, 2003), and a council 
can even have this role as part of its mandate (Skoie, 
2000). In some cases, a council can thus identify 
more closely with the interests of the scientists than 
those of the government, and can act as a mediator 
of scientists’ views or initiate processes of policy 
developments by itself. 
In line with these examples and arguments, as 
well as other analysis (van der Meulen and Rip, 
1998; Caswill, 2003), we will argue that research 
councils have to be responsive to both government 
and scientists to be able to fulfil their mission. They 
can therefore be expected to develop their organisa-
tion, strategies and actions with the aim of satisfying 
policy-makers, scientists or both, depending on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the combined relation-
ships with both of them. 
The actual position between government and sci-
ence in most cases will be somewhere in between 
and be susceptible to change according to variations 
in government policies, composition and policies of 
the board, legal status, authority delegated, and so 
on. In this way, the council will be intermediating 
between the interests of policy-makers and the scien-
tific community (Braun and Benninghoff, 2003; van 
der Meulen, 2003). 
Research councils as responsive institutions 
Research councils should also be treated as organisa-
tions with system characteristics influencing their 
responses. A much used distinction of organisations 
is between rational, natural and open systems (Scott, 
1992; Thompson and McHugh, 1995). Councils will 
probably display elements of them all, but we find 
the definition of the open system to fit research 
councils best. An open system is embedded and de-
pendent on its relationships with its surroundings, 
has undefined boundaries and frequent interaction 
with other organisations. Internally, open systems 
can be more loosely coupled, and the various parts 
and departments can be pursuing their own strategies 
independent of the overall strategy of the organisa-
tion. Loose coupling might lead to tensions internal 
to the council, between council and government or 
between council and scientists; there is also the pos-
sibility that the council maintains mixed relation-
ships or responses at the same time (van der Meulen, 
2003). 
An analysis of the Norwegian Research Council in 
the mid 1990s found, for example, strong tensions be-
tween the administration and the board (Statskonsult, 
1994), while there have also been conflicts regarding 
the priorities between basic and mission-oriented re-
search (Skoie, 2000). Tensions between council and 
Government are seen in the case of Austria, where 
ministries found alternative agencies to fund research 
instead of trying to change the mission of the existing 
ones (Arnold, 2004), and in the case of Norway, 
where the councils’ role as policy advisors has been 
unclear (Arnold et al, 2001). 
Another study shows various relationships in a 
council according to operative roles of council de-
partments; for example, the scientific staff who 
manage peer-review processes and monitor scientific 
progress can have a stronger affinity with the inter-
ests of the scientists than the administrative staff 
who will orient themselves towards expectations 
from the government (Caswill, 2003). We should 
also be aware that councils sometimes might act as 
natural systems — organisations in which the par-
ticipants share the common interest of surviving as a 
system — in times of organisational restructuring, of 
which there are examples in the countries examined. 
In such situations, those identifying with the organi-
sation are expected to contribute to its defence. 
 
Research councils can be expected to 
develop their organisation, strategies 
and actions with the aim of satisfying 
policy-makers, scientists or both, 
depending on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the combined 
relationships 
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As open systems, the responses of councils will to 
a varying degree be dependent upon others. Among 
theories on institutional responses, the resource  
dependency approach put emphasis on the depend-
encies of an organisation and how it adapts to them 
(Scott, 1992), and the possibilities of meeting in-
compatible requirements from various external ac-
tors and the choice of various strategies to adapt to 
these requirements (Oliver, 1991). 
A research council is normally very dependent on 
government for its resources, and this will most 
likely make the council responsive to the require-
ments and policies of those providing the resources 
as dependency will increase with the amount of re-
sources coming from the outside. If there is more 
than one provider of resources, we should expect 
greater freedom in the choice of responses, as the 
council might be able to seek out alternative sources 
of funding and to juggle between various expecta-
tions and requirements. 
The strategic contingency approach, on the other 
hand, stresses the freedom of an agency to determine 
its own actions against the limitations of internal and 
external structures (Scott, 1992). An organisation 
will always have several choices open for action, 
and the decision as to which action to take will de-
pend on a variable set of interests, goals and powers 
opting for a “functional fit” between external re-
quirements and the internal organisational structures 
they require (Thompson and McHugh. 1995). For a 
research council, this approach implies that there 
might be several options for response, and that re-
sponses will be dependent on from whom, and with 
what force, the external pressures come, and how the 
internal organisation is prepared and co-ordinated to 
meet the pressures. 
Types of council and ways of delegation 
The relationship between council and government 
can be understood as maintained through an explicit 
or implicit ‘contract’, regulating the tasks and man-
date of the council, that is, its mission. Following 
Braun (1998), funding agencies can in general be di-
vided into three categories according to their role in 
the realisation of science policy. Science-based 
agencies serve all disciplines, respond to problems 
raised by disciplinary communities and tend to pro-
pose disciplinary solutions, that is, they tend to 
choose disciplinary-oriented instruments for their 
funding. 
Strategic agencies serve the solution of particular 
problem areas (for instance, health, environment, pub-
lic services), respond to problems raised by discipli-
nary communities, the scientific community outside 
academic institutions and external actors. Strategic 
agencies seek disciplinary and inter-disciplinary  
solutions to the problems posed. According to Braun, 
this is the largest group of intermediaries. 
Political agencies respond to problems raised by 
external actors, and tend to utilise multi-disciplinary 
schemes. These categories can be considered ideal 
types, where the tasks and missions of the council 
change as policies and practices develop over time, 
and councils might change their roles and their posi-
tion in the typology according to the development of 
policies. 
Braun also points to variations in use of instru-
ments to help solve scientific problems by the various 
types of agencies (Braun, 1998). A science-based 
agency tends to select discipline-oriented solutions 
and a political agency is oriented towards the solu-
tion of broader problems and tends to select multi-
disciplinary solutions. Thus, the way a council tries 
to accomplish its mission is a matter of the way  
it chooses to delegate the solving of scientific  
problems to scientists. 
Following Braun (2003)1 once more, we can typify 
how the forms of delegation have developed over 
time. From ‘blind delegation’ being the typical form 
from the early days of science up to the 1960s, dele-
gation developed through a transition period when 
curbed public spending resulted in ‘incentive’ and 
‘steady state’ modes by the end of the 1970s, before 
the more formal ‘contract’ mode and the ‘network’ 
mode emerged during the 1990s. The modes of 
delegation are reflected in the choice of selection 
mechanisms and instruments used by councils, and 
we can assume that use of instruments will be  
dependent on the type of council and type of  
delegation. 
Analytical model and methodology 
Following from the theoretical discussion, a council’s 
relationships with its surroundings are seldom char-
acterised by a distinct or unambiguous relationship 
to a principal. Its responses to science policy will 
thus not depend solely on the relationship with the 
government, but also partly on the relationships  
between council and scientists, and partly on the in-
ternal organisation of the council, its dependencies 
and abilities to exert strategic actions. These ele-
ments are difficult to analyse, as they are constituted 
by a complex mix of history, legitimacy, use and 
balance of power, institutional perceptions, and so 
on. Our approach is to simplify these relationships 
into a model that, as far as possible, can be opera-
tionalised and compared across councils and  
countries, as well as taking into account the avail-
ability of relevant data (formalised in Figure 1). 
We first assume that transferring funds to councils 
is the main way government has of implementing  
research policies, or, to use the principal–agent cat-
egories, to exert its role as principal towards the 
council. Since councils are dependent on govern-
ment funding to be able to fulfil their mission and 
the expectations of scientists, according to the re-
source-dependency approach, these transfers create a 
dependency towards government, which entails loy-
alty and responsiveness towards government policy 
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as well. More specifically, we assume a council that 
is dependent on one main source of funding (for in-
stance, a ministry) will tend to be responsive to the 
wishes of this actor, while a council having several 
large sources of funding can introduce more freely 
its own strategies or make compromises among the 
priorities of the different partners. 
The number of funding sources and their relative 
strength in terms of funds transferred is thus the first 
proxy we introduce for our analysis, being aware 
that transfer of funds is not the only way of exerting 
research policy through councils. Direct instructions, 
legislation and statutes regulate the institutional 
freedom, and the national traditions of political cul-
ture, style of government, distribution of power and 
so on will be of influence. We thus have to be aware 
of the general political context in which the transfers 
take place. 
The responsiveness created through the combined 
dependency/loyalty towards a council’s sources of 
funding will be transformed by several factors inter-
nally in the council. First, it will be affected by the type 
of council and its mission. A council is likely to ‘trans-
late’ government policy into operative programmes 
that, from the council’s point of view, contribute best 
to the fulfilment of its mission. We thus use the coun-
cil’s mission statements as a broad indication for the 
expected direction of a council response. 
We are aware that such statements can be formu-
lated in a rhetoric or ideal language and should be 
treated carefully but, on the other hand, we are also 
aware that such statements often are regarded as so 
important that considerable debate is evoked when 
they are altered. In addition, we can make a more 
robust account of whom the council actually serves 
by examining the real allocation of funds. We as-
sume that a council having only one type of benefi-
ciary institution (for instance, universities) or only 
one sector of society (for instance, agriculture re-
search) will be dependent on being recognised by 
these, and thus will be more inclined to transform 
policies towards their needs. The mix of beneficiar-
ies can thus influence a council’s responses. 
Secondly, responses to government policy will be 
transformed by the council board, as it will be the 
decisional body for how to implement policies into 
practice. We find it likely that a council board with a 
majority of scientists will be more responsive to the 
needs of science, and thus tend to transform policies 
into actions deemed favourable from the scientists’ 
point of view. On the other hand, a council board 
with a majority from political circles or industry, 
will probably be more directly responsive to policy-
makers, industrial or societal needs. 
We use the composition of the board as another 
proxy for how a council is likely to respond to poli-
cies, being aware that the composition depends on 
who has the right to nominate the members, which 
again is part of the historical tradition and em-
beddedness of the council in national policy. We 
should also be aware that responses might be af-
fected by the size and internal organisation of the 
council into divisions, and so on, but an analysis of 
institutional ‘looseness’ is beyond the possibilities of 
what we can do in this context. 
For assessing the councils’ responses to policy 
changes, we use the categories of funding instruments 
as a proxy, implying new instruments used or changes 
in relative size of budgets might indicate responses to 
external influences. In general, this implies that a 
council responsive to government will respond to 
changes in policy by changing its own portfolio, that 
is, bringing in new instruments to promote goals set by 
policy-makers or change the actual distribution of re-
sources between the existing instruments. 
On the other hand, we can assume that a non-
responsive council will keep to instruments well 
known and acclaimed by the beneficiaries. We are 
aware that this is a simplification, as science policy 
does not (always) work in this one-dimensional way, 
and there will be feedback on the actions of a coun-
cil. The council’s response to policy can thus be 
welcomed by all parties and does not necessarily 
imply compliancy towards government. 
By observations of these proxies, we cannot in any 
exact way establish criteria to assess how responsive 
 Ministry / ministries
Research council
Responses transformed by: 
• Mission 
• Beneficiaries 
• Composition of board
Instruments portfolio and beneficiaries
Policy / funding Dependency / loyalty
Feedback 
Figure 1. Analytical model 
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a council is to policies, and observations should be 
evaluated on the background of the specific national 
context. Our data on mission statements, composi-
tion of boards and councils and sources of funding 
has been collected from annual reports, government 
documents and prior evaluations and analysis. For 
contextual analysis, we rely on existing material, as 
well as our knowledge of the national science sys-
tems. Data on beneficiaries and instruments was 
made available through a study of project funding 
for the period 1970–2005 in several countries.2 
The choice of comparing Austria, Norway and 
Switzerland, is partly because these countries re-
semble each other in research organisation and char-
acteristics of the research funding system, and partly 
because they have one or more research councils op-
erating competitive-based funding instruments at 
arm’s length from the research performers. This in 
contrast to France, for example, where Centre  
National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) is a 
combined funding and research operating agency, or 
Italy, where the former research council CNR was 
fundamentally changed (Potì and Reale, 2005). The 
general methodology applied for funding data and 
comparisons is discussed extensively in other papers 
(Lepori, 2006b; Lepori et al, 2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 
2007b).3 
When analysing the institutional level as opposed 
to the national level, we encounter more often breaks 
in time series and ways of classifying. We are also 
aware that, even if concepts and terminology might 
seem homogenous, the underlying understanding of 
what it means might vary over time, between institu-
tions and countries. When we present developments 
in research policy and organisation at macro level, at 
research councils’ level, as well as developments of 
research funding, the reader should be aware that 
this could not be done at a very detailed level, and 
that some elements or developments have had to be 
omitted for the sake of simplicity. 
Research councils in the three countries 
This section briefly introduces the research councils 
in the three countries (Table 1) and their historical 
developments in terms of years of establishment, re-
organisations and mergers, with some references to 
the debates leading up to reorganisations. 
Austria 
The Austrian Science Fund (FWF) and the Austrian 
Industrial Research Promotion Fund (FFF) were 
both created in 1967. Combined they have held the 
largest share of project funding in Austrian research, 
accounting for more than 54% of total project fund-
ing volume in 2002 (Dinges, 2006). By the reform 
act in 2004, the governance structure of FWF was 
somewhat changed, but its overall structure was not 
altered. From 1967 until 2004, FFF was the main 
funding agency for industrial research in all 
branches, but a noteworthy feature of the Austrian 
research funding system was the establishment of 
technology-oriented support measures outside FFF 
from the end of 1970s. 
In 1987, the virtual Innovation and Technology 
Fund (ITF) was established, largely steered by a 
board dominated by ministries, whereas its funding 
was administered jointly by FFF and the ERP.4 The 
Technologie Impulse Gesellschaft (TIG) was created 
in 1998 and the Austrian Space Agency (ASA), es-
tablished 1972, got involved in research and tech-
nology programme management, as it operated the 
European Space Agency in Austria and started to 
prepare the nanotechnology programme on behalf of 
 
Austria, Norway and Switzerland were 
chosen because they resemble each 
other in research organisation and 
characteristics of the research funding 
system, and they have research 
councils operating competitive-based 
funding instruments at arm’s length 
from research performers 
Table 1. Research councils included in the analysis 
Country Code Full name Established Dissolved 
Austria FFF Austrian Industrial Research Promotion Fund 1967 2004 
 FWF Austrian Science Fund 1967  
 FFG The Austrian Research Promotion Agency 2004  
Norway NTNF Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 1946 1993 
 NLVF The Agricultural Research Council of Norway 1946 1993 
 NAVF The Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities 1949 1993 
 NFFR The Norwegian Council for Fishery Research 1972 1993 
 NORAS The Norwegian Research Council for Applied Social Science 1987 1993 
 NFR The Research Council of Norway 1993  
Switzerland SNF The Swiss National Science Foundation 1952  
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the Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technol-
ogy (BMVIT) in 2000. 
There was thus some fragmentation in the organ-
isational structure, which was ended when the Aus-
trian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) was 
established in 2004 through a merger of FFF, TIG, 
ASA, and the Bureau for International Technology 
Co-operations (BIT). Upon the merger, FFF was dis-
solved and FFG was set up as a limited corporation 
on behalf of the Ministry of Transport, Innovation 
and Technology (BMVIT) and the Ministry of 
Economy and Labour (BMWA). 
Norway 
Norway established three research councils during 
the late 1940s: one was devoted to industrial needs 
and technological development (NTNF); one to the 
needs of agriculture (NLVF); and one was academic 
(NAVF). Following a discussion in the 1960s of the 
needs in the fisheries, a council devoted to this in-
dustry was established in 1972 (NFFR), while a fifth 
devoted to applied social sciences was established in 
1987 (NORAS).5 By the early 1990s, Norway thus 
had five councils with a mixed portfolio of aca-
demic, technological development and innovation 
goals. 
After a discussion focusing on lack of co-
ordination, excess resources used for administration, 
lack of integration between basic and applied  
research, problems of handling relationships with 
external partners, and so on, the five councils were 
merged into NFR in 1993 (Skoie, 2000; 2005). The 
new council was divided into six non-disciplinary 
operational divisions, all integrating both basic re-
search and innovation. After an evaluation of the 
council in 2001 (Arnold et al, 2001), it was reorgan-
ised into three divisions. By 2002, the council allo-
cated 43% of the total project funding volume in 
Norway. 
Switzerland 
The Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) was 
established in 1952, and is the single most important 
organisation for project funding at the national level, 
accounting in 2002 for slightly less than 50% of the 
total funding volume and for more than 60% when 
excluding international agencies (Lepori, 2006a). 
The organisation of the SNF has been stable 
throughout its 50 years of existence. Most changes 
have been pushed by quantitative expansion, leading 
to growth in the number of members of the National 
Research Council (NRC, the main body of the coun-
cil) and of the secretariat, and to its organisation in 
divisions. Political intervention in the SNF internal 
organisation and functioning has been practically 
absent, and Switzerland has thus had only one re-
search council. 
Empirical evidence 
This section presents the empirical evidence along 
the proxies outlined previously. The findings will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Sources of funding 
The Austrian councils, FFF and FWF, were largely 
dependent on the annual federal budget (Table 2). In 
the case of FFF, the annual federal budget was the 
Table 2. Main sources of funding for research councils (% of total annual budget)
Council Sources of funding 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
FFF (AU) Federal Government 
Austrian National Bank 
Loans, returns, etc 
Anticipation Budget 2001 
100 100 82 
18 
20 
14 
14 
46 
 
FWF (AU) Federal Government 
Austrian National Bank/National Fund 
Commissioned Federal programmes 
100 100 87 
13 
58 
34 
8 
57 
32 
11 
FFG (AU)      NA 
NTNF (NO) Ministry of Industry 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
Other ministries/public 
Football pool funds 
76 
7 
15 
43 
21 
20 
12 
71 
12 
4 
9 
  
NLVF (NO) Ministry of Agriculture 
Football pool funds 
Industry 
80 
9 
5 
66 
16 
54 
29 
10 
  
NFFR (NO) Ministry of Fisheries 
Other ministries 
100 73 
2 
82 
12 
  
NAVF (NO) Ministry of Education and Research 
Other ministries/public 
Football pool funds 
82 
80 
NA 
54 
26 
18 
  
NFR (NO) Ministry of Industry 
Ministry of Education and Research 
Other ministries/public 
   28 
31 
39 
19 
40 
37 
SNF (CH) Ministry of Home Affairs  100 100 100 100 100 
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sole funding source until 1981, while, from then on, 
the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) started to con-
tribute (22% of the total by 2000). From around 
1990, FFF started to administer funds from the vir-
tual Innovation and Technology Fund (ITF) as well 
as European Union regional funds. Since 1997, spe-
cial funds from the federal budget have been added, 
but at the cost of the regular budget. To provide 
maximum stability in its funding, FFF took money 
from the following year’s budget, and utilised finan-
cial returns from loans and guarantees. 
In 1995 and 1999, the annual federal budget de-
voted to FFF was cut by more than 30%, leading to a 
severe financial crisis. Also for FWF, the National 
Bank provided some funding from 1982 onwards 
and state support was reduced during the mid-1990s. 
From 2004 onwards, National Bank funding for both 
councils were allocated by the newly founded  
National Foundation. Also for FFG, funding largely 
stems from the federal budget.6 
In Norway, the mission-oriented councils NTNF 
(technology), NLVF (agriculture) and NFFR (fisher-
ies) were mainly funded by the ministries responsi-
ble for the equivalent sectors of society according to 
the “sector principle” of governance (Skoie, 2000). 
Typically, the NTNF got more than 70% of its fund-
ing from the Ministry of Industry. The academically 
oriented council NAVF had, on the other hand, a 
more diversified income, especially from the 1980s 
on. Except for the fisheries council in its early years, 
no council has been dependent on one single source 
of funding, since for all councils there were other 
public sources or industry contributing. 
A system that reserved parts of the income from 
the nationalised system of football betting for re-
search purposes was established shortly after World 
War II; for this, Government had no voice in the  
distribution, increasing councils independence from 
Government (Skoie, 2005). This mechanism con-
tributed as much as 80% of the funding of the NLVF 
and NTNF in 1970, while it later saw reductions and 
was abandoned altogether in 2002. Since the estab-
lishment of NFR in 1993, no ministry contributes as 
much as half of its funding. The Ministry of Educa-
tion and Research is the largest source, but 15 other 
ministries allocated funding to the council in 2005, 
of which six contributed more than 5% of the total. 
In the Swiss case, the SNF, over the years, has  
received virtually all its funding from central Gov-
ernment through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
The framework decisions on financial allocations to 
SNF have been the most important possibility of  
influencing SNF and of setting specific objectives by 
the state, and all discussion concerning the SNF pol-
icy and role have taken place in this context. 
Mission and beneficiaries 
The Austrian council FFF was set up as a responsive 
mode agency for industrial R&D projects. Accord-
ing to the 2004 evaluation of the council, FFF has 
remained “remarkably true” to this mission (Arnold 
et al, 2004). Even so, the council has deviated 
somewhat from this mission in the last ten years of 
its existence as, in co-operation with ministries and 
other actors, it also managed programmes of a top-
down character (for instance, ITF programmes) and 
those designed and steered by ministries, and de-
fined specific programme-like schemes for the re-
sponsive mode calls. 
FFF beneficiaries were mostly the business sector. 
In 2002, about 26% of FFF projects included sci-
ence–industry collaborations and, at maximum, an 
estimated 31% of FFF funds were for academia  
(Arnold, 2004). Since the reorganisation into FFG  
in 2004, the mission has still been predominantly to-
wards supporting strategic research for the benefit of 
the economy and business, but science–industry 
linkages are supposed to be higher than was the case 
of FFF. Ministries can assign programme manage-
ment to promote technology development to FFG. 
The FWF had a mission towards basic and aca-
demic research, and with the same responsive mode 
principle of operation as FFF. It is noteworthy that 
the mission states FWF has an equal commitment to 
all fields of science, which has consequences for vir-
tually all programmes in the way that all measures 
are generic in terms of scientific disciplines and no a 
priori distribution of the funds over different disci-
plines exists (see van der Meulen, 2004). The mis-
sion has been realised by FWF funding mainly basic 
research almost exclusively in the higher education 
sector. 
During the 1970s, the Norwegian councils’ close 
links to the ministries affected their mission, which, 
however, had some noticeable variations (Skoie, 
2005). The technological-oriented NTNF had a mis-
sion towards applied sciences and industrial rele-
vance, and should promote technological and natural 
science and the use of scientific results for the bene-
fit of industry. Responding to stagnating industrial 
developments and criticism of the abilities of the re-
search system to contribute to the needs of industry, 
references to economic competitiveness and growth 
became more direct (Skoie, 2005). 
For the beneficiaries, until the mid-1980s, NTNF 
had its own research institutes, to which a large part 
of its funding was allocated (Figure 2). After criti-
cism of this arrangement in 1981, the institutes be-
came independent units and a large part of the 
portfolio was allocated to private and industrial re-
search, and a small part to universities (Arnold, 
2001). For the two specialised councils, NLVF and 
NFFR, the mission statements had a commitment to 
the agricultural and fisheries sectors and the needs of 
industry. NFFR allocated considerable funding to 
higher-education institutions, with an increase to re-
search institutes and a decrease to industry over the 
years. 
The 1970 mission statement of the academic-
oriented NAVF was to promote scientific research in 
all scientific fields. A debate during the 1970s  
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concerning a Government proposal to establish a 
new research council for funding research for socie-
tal planning resulted in the establishment of a new 
division within the NAVF, and the mission state-
ment came to include “… research for society’s 
planning needs” (Skoie, 2005). After a separate 
council for applied social science was established in 
1987, the mission statement again refers only to the 
promotion of the scientific disciplines. Around 60% 
of the NAVF funding in 1990 went to academic in-
stitutions, 18% to research institutes, and 22% to  
individuals and national priority programmes outside 
the regular institutional structure. 
After the former councils were merged into NFR 
1993, the mission statement gives this council much 
wider responsibility: it should increase the knowl-
edge base and meet society’s demand for basic and 
applied knowledge, and for innovation. The amal-
gamation into one council with broader objectives 
and services seems to have caused a vague and gen-
eral mission statement without favouring any sector, 
type of research or discipline. The broad mission is 
reflected in the composition of beneficiaries (Figure 
2), but a slight turn towards the benefit of higher-
education institutions is observable in the 2000–2005 
period, while private beneficiaries have had a  
reduction from 27% to 13% of the total. 
The mission of the Swiss SNF is described in its 
statutes and in the research act of 1983. The main 
aims are to support independent (investigator-
driven) research in universities and research insti-
tutes, while interdisciplinary and problem-oriented 
programme research comes second and training of 
young researchers also plays a part. SNF can also  
be charged with executing national research  
programmes on subjects decided by the Swiss Gov-
ernment and to fund national competence networks 
in research. 
The option of funding laboratories directly was 
discarded at the creation of the SNF, which deals di-
rectly with the principal investigators with very little 
involvement of their university. Higher-education 
institutions receive about 90% of the total funds: this 
share has not changed significantly in recent years. 
The rest is divided among some public-research in-
stitutes, individuals and some consultancy compa-
nies. Direct funding to private companies is almost 
non-existent and SNF cannot by statute fund  
research of direct commercial interest. 
Composition of board and its nomination 
From their establishment, FWF and FFF were given 
a strongly autonomous status since governance 
structures were dominated by beneficiaries rather 
than by ministries (see Arnold, 2004) and, until 
2004, their governance structures remained un-
changed (Table 3). FFF was governed by a presid-
ium that consisted of 18 members, where the 11 
voting members were a subset of the Board, which 
in turn consisted of 31 members appointed entirely 
by the Social Partners7 except for three non-voting 
members appointed by ministries. 
The governance structure of FFG is entirely dif-
ferent, since it is a limited corporation on behalf of 
BMVIT and BMWA, which appoint the two mana-
ging directors via a tendering procedure approved by 
the supervisory board dominated by ministries. 
FWF, on the other hand, was largely governed by 
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The main aims of the Swiss SNF are to 
support independent research in 
universities and research institutes, 
while interdisciplinary and problem-
oriented programme research comes 
second and training of young 
researchers also plays a part 
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the scientific community. The Assembly of Dele-
gates, the Executive Board and the Kuratorium, 
which takes the research funding decisions, all had a 
majority from higher education. 
Whereas internal regulations were optimised and 
not altered dramatically by the 2004 reform, a su-
pervisory board was also introduced for FWF 
(FTFG, 2006: §5.a), deciding FWF long-term work 
plans and appointing and recalling the management. 
Hence, the strategic competencies of the supervisory 
board are extensive and policy-makers now actively 
participate in the decision-making process as three 
out of seven supervisory board members are ap-
pointed by ministries. Of the rest, three are  
appointed by the Assembly of Delegates (dominated 
by universities). 
The three strategic Norwegian councils had a con-
siderable representation from industry, as many as 
two thirds of the NTNF members coming from  
industry in 1990. The nomination and appointment 
of the board were, in the early period, the responsi-
bility of the council assembly, while, in 1990, the 
appointment was transferred to the Ministry of In-
dustry. Also in the agricultural council (NLVF) the 
board until the 1980s was appointed by the council, 
while this right later was transferred to the Govern-
ment, although the institutions represented had kept 
their right to nominate the members. 
For the fisheries council (NFFR), members of the 
board were nominated by the Ministry of Fisheries 
and appointed by the Government. The board of the 
NAVF was dominated by scientists and had no in-
dustrial representation. In the early period, the Min-
istry of Education and Research nominated four of 
the board members and four others were nominated 
by the assembly, while later the Government ap-
pointed the majority of the representatives. Since the 
establishment of NFR, the Government has kept 
more at arm’s length, as it has not appointed any 
Government official except in cases where they have 
come from Government research institutions at a 
relative long distance from central Government. 
The internal organisation of SNF is based on a  
national research council (NRC) composed of 100 
researchers (mostly university professors) spread 
over scientific disciplines. NRC is more a collection 
of representatives of the scientific disciplines than a 
corporate body. In the past, three-quarters of the 
members have been chosen by the SNF itself, while 
the rest has been nominated by the Government (in 
practice they have been co-opted by the NRC). Since 
2000, all members have been elected by the commit-
tee of the SNF foundation council through an open-
call procedure. 
The whole organisation of the SNF emphasises the 
role of the individual members of the NRC, who are 
responsible for the choice of the reviewers of project 
proposals, and for submitting the propositions of de-
cisions to the NRC. In addition, there is a foundation 
council linking SNF and the stakeholders composed 
of representatives of the universities, the central state 
and the cantons, scientific societies and the world of 
culture. Most of the strategic documents and deci-
sions are taken by NRC together with the secretariat. 
Instruments and funding allocation 
For a long time, the Austrian FFF operated bottom-
up R&D project funding for all branches as its sole 
funding instrument. Except for some technology-
specific initiatives, FFF virtually did not extend its 
instrument portfolio, and programmes geared to-
wards science–industry collaborations, networks and 
thematic-oriented programmes largely passed FFF 
by (Arnold, 2004). Only in the beginning of the 
1990s, FFF became partially involved in thematic-
oriented, top-down programme implementation 
through the programme management of a series of 
technology programmes designed and launched by 
BMVIT (Figure 3).8 
Table 3. Composition of steering boards of research councils
 Austria  
prior to 2004 
 Austria  
after 2004 
Norway  
1980 
Norway  
2004 
Switzerland
 
FWF 
Assembly 
FFF 
Board 
 FWF 
Supervisory 
Board 
FFG 
Supervisory 
Board 
NTNF 
Board 
NAVF 
Board 
NFR 
Board 
SNF 
Council 
Policy 5 (nv) 4 (nv) 3 7 1 4   
Higher education 52 3 (nv) 3a  1 4 3 100 
Non-university Sector 4    1 1 2  
Trade/labour/ind-ustry 
associations 
6 24  3 5 1 2  
Others 5 (nv) c  1b   2 1  
Total voting members 62 24 7 10 8 12 8 100 
Notes:  nv = non-voting members 
a Appointed by Assembly of Delegates, which is still dominated by academia 
b Appointed by the six other members of the Supervisory Board; if no decision on seventh member occurs, the Council for 
Research and Technology creates a three-person shortlist from which ministries have to select a member 
c Members of FWF board 
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The tradition of bottom-up research funding  
did not vanish with the creation of FFG, since the 
funding scheme was converted into FFG General 
Programmes, still by far the largest direct research 
funding instrument for industry. Funding of individ-
ual research projects has also been the single most 
important instrument of FWF. Until 1990, the port-
folio of instruments consisted mainly of individual 
research projects and thematic priority programmes; 
since then, the programme portfolio has increased 
dramatically. Today it consists of about 15 pro-
grammes, some of which are mandated by BMBWK 
and BMVIT. In 2005, mandated programmes ac-
counted for 12% and individual research projects for 
50% of total funding. 
Until the mid-1980s, the Norwegian NTNF 
largely used instruments dedicated to its own re-
search institutes; these were mostly thematic instru-
ments. When most institutes became independent 
units, a large part of the portfolio was allocated to 
private and industrial research (Arnold et al, 2001). 
Even if NTNF allocated some resources to universi-
ties as PhD and travel grants, its instruments were 
almost solely designed to promote innovation or 
thematic programmes. The fisheries council (NFFR) 
utilised almost exclusively thematic instruments op-
erated in response mode in the earlier period and as 
larger programmes in the later years (94% of the  
total in 1990). 
In the 1970s, NAVF used academic instruments 
allocated as individual grants and free projects in re-
sponsive mode. These developed partly into pro-
grammes during the 1980s. In the late 1980s, 
national priority areas were introduced and defined 
by Government, and administered by the council.  
By 1992, more than 60% of the council’s funding 
was organised through programmes and national 
priorities. 
For the amalgamated council, NFR, about 40% of 
the funding has been allocated through academic in-
struments, while instruments for innovation have de-
creased and thematic instruments increased. The 
number of instruments has proliferated, especially 
those with a thematic content, such as targeted pro-
grammes, centres of excellence and programmes for 
basic research. By 2005, less than 20% of the total 
was allocated to the ‘classical’ academic instruments 
of grants and free projects and, by 2006, the council 
stopped giving individual grants. More than 80%  
of funding for centres of excellence and basic re-
search programmes was allocated to higher-education 
institutions. 
The Swiss SNF has dominantly allocated funding 
by responsive-mode instruments. In 2005, about 
80% of the budget was attributed this way, either as 
research projects (60%) or as individual grants 
(20%). Thematic programmes to answer to urgent 
social and political needs were introduced in the 
1970s (national research programmes), while SNF 
also managed a set of technological programmes in 
the 1990s (priority programmes). These have been 
replaced since 2000 by an instrument to finance  
national competence networks in research (NCCR), 
with a stronger orientation towards basic research. 
Overall, thematic instruments appeared in the mid-
1970s and reached about a quarter of the total SNF 
budget by the mid-1990s, but then decreased to 
about 5% in 2005. This orientation towards respon-
sive-mode funding has been confirmed by the new 
plan for the years 2008–2011. 
National trajectories 
Before we discuss our findings, we would like to 
point out that, in terms of the total amount of R&D 
funding, research councils in all three countries have 
succeeded in increasing their share of total govern-
ment allocations for R&D (Figure 4). Comparing 
also research council project funding by purchasing 
power parities confirms the findings, as purchasing 
power in the three countries was at about the same 
level around 1980, while, during the 1980s, funding 
from the Norwegian councils was considerably more 
powerful before coming back to the level of the 
other two countries by the mid-1990s. Over the last 
few years, funding by the Austrian councils has 
gained in relative power. We conclude from this that 
over time the governments in the three countries to a 
varying degree have been willing to invest in their 
research councils, indicating some variations in the 
relationship between governments and councils.9 
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Austria 
In the Austrian case, in our opinion, we find evi-
dence of FFF and FWF being highly dependent on 
Government for their funding, but the internal  
governing structures and relationships with the bene-
ficiaries has made them largely unresponsive to 
Government policies. In the end, this has provoked a 
total reorganising of the councils by Government, 
introducing a much stronger and direct Government 
influence on them from 2004 onwards. This devel-
opment is open to several interpretations and possi-
ble explanations, but we point to some evidence to 
support our interpretation. 
Governmental influence on budgets was promi-
nent, since, during the 1970s and 1980s, they came 
almost 100% directly from Government; thus a de-
pendency is to be expected. Even when budgets later 
came to be spread over more sources, to some extent 
they came indirectly from Government and Gov-
ernment direct allocations were reduced accordingly. 
Despite this dependency, the councils stuck to their 
original mission until the 1990s; the dedication to 
the FFF mission is demonstrated by the fact that, 
when Government budgets were reduced, the FFF 
shifted budgets forward to be able to meet its obliga-
tions towards the beneficiaries. 
The legal mandate and mission of FFF provided 
an excellent basis for gaining wide responsibilities 
for innovation policy, but it restricted itself mainly 
to a narrow concept of bottom-up research-project 
funding by use of a traditional and well-established 
set of instruments acclaimed by the beneficiaries 
(Arnold, 2004). The lack of response first made 
Government initiate new agencies and instruments 
outside FFF. Later, Government reorganised the 
council system, introducing legislation allowing for 
direct influence on the programme portfolio by min-
istries, a strong ministerial representation on the 
boards (three of seven representative) and stronger 
links to the national strategies developed by RFT. 
The FWF seems to have developed much in paral-
lel, playing the role of a science-based council fund-
ing disciplinary projects in a responsive mode 
selected by quality criteria. The basic funding princi-
ples and internal organisation of FWF, however, have 
not altered dramatically with the reorganisation, and 
bottom-up research funding still accounts for the 
largest share of research-project funding. This might 
be a sign of unresponsiveness continuing. 
The interesting question is how unresponsiveness 
to Government could prevail over such a long time, 
since the councils actually were totally dependent 
upon Government. Internally the councils were 
dominated by beneficiaries, since the Austrian 
model of governance delegates considerable power 
to organised societal interests, making it possible for 
the beneficiaries to remain in control of the councils. 
Outside, responsibilities for research within Gov-
ernment was fragmented. The considerable change 
in Government policies and control of the councils 
after the 2004 evaluation might be considered as an 
example of a reorientation of the Austrian arrange-
ments in the direction of a principal–agent model in-
cluding greater Government steering capacity and an 
increased will to allocate public resources (compare 
with Figure 4). 
Norway 
In the Norwegian case, we find an example of coun-
cils being responsive to Government, but the sector-
based organisation of the science system and funding 
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In Austria, the research councils seem 
to be highly dependent on Government 
for their funding, but the internal 
governing structures and relationships 
with beneficiaries has made them 
largely unresponsive to Government 
policies 
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from several sources had fragmentation of the hori-
zontal co-ordination, with rather unstable or fluctua-
ting constellations as consequences. Quite close  
co-operation among councils, ministries and benefi-
ciaries has created a situation in which these partners 
created ‘collaborative responsiveness’ within each 
sector. Councils were thus mostly able to balance the 
wishes of policy-makers and beneficiaries by using 
thematic instruments, but largely within the limited 
context of an economic sector. 
Overall, we find it difficult to pinpoint definite 
patterns of development as both Government poli-
cies and council responses seem to have varied 
greatly. It is likely that the lack of co-ordination and 
unclear role of councils were part of the rationale 
behind the fundamental reorganisation (Skoie, 
2000). The reorganisation probably came about not 
because councils were not responding to science pol-
icy, but rather, as the evidence below indicates, be-
cause the way the system was organised and steered 
asked for better co-ordination. 
The mission-oriented councils had funding from 
several sources, but usually with one ministry as the 
main source (with some variations over time). Nor-
wegian ministries also funded projects outside the 
councils and were consequently somewhat de-
coupling councils from Government. During the 
1980s, this practice was to some extent reversed, but 
ministries partly opposed regulation and continued 
to initiate and fund projects of their own in addition 
to allocating funding to councils. The science-based 
NAVF had most of its funding from the football 
pool funds and was virtually independent of direct 
Government funding. 
In total, these variations in funding might open 
the way for constellations of a more unstable kind 
with unclear dependencies. The composition of the 
boards also shifted over time; ministries took greater 
control of councils during the 1980s by increasing 
their representation and then decreasing it again after 
the establishment of NFR. These shifts in govern-
mental influence probably reflect some ambiguity in 
the ministries regarding the usefulness of the coun-
cils and the need for direct influence. 
Also the mission and allocation to beneficiaries 
varied among councils, and there were considerable 
variations over time. Agriculture (NLVF) and fisher-
ies (NFFR) had a very restricted mission and to 
some extent had the role of political agencies, since 
they partly responded to priorities set outside the 
scientific realm as a result of problems caused by in-
dustrial restructuring. NTNF addressed broader  
industrial and technological development, but for a 
long time favoured its own research institutes. 
NAVF exemplifies a different case because it  
operated basically as a science-based council with 
responsive-mode disciplinary funding schemes, 
though not only allocating funds to HEI. The mis-
sion and beneficiaries of the NFR cover all sectors 
and types of research, including the management of 
programmes initiated by policy-makers. Again, we 
interpret these variations as expressing some uncer-
tainty within Government about the role of councils. 
Switzerland 
The development of SNF exemplifies a case in 
which the combination of a relatively weak state and 
an autonomous council tightly integrated with, and 
responsive to, a strong academic community have 
been able to defend this community’s interests and 
thus also the SNF’s own existence and strategies. By 
successfully manoeuvring its responses to the satis-
faction of both policy-makers and beneficiaries, it 
has succeeded in keeping its organisation and mode 
of action virtually unchanged. The examination of 
SNF’s share of funding above might indicate that the 
defence of a traditional role might have come at the 
price of its share of public resources. 
The council has essentially been funded from one 
single Government source, potentially causing some 
dependence on this source. So SNF accepted in a pe-
riod some change in its direction of being a strategic 
agency by including in its portfolio the national re-
search programmes and national competence net-
works in research (NCCRs), where the Federal 
Government participates in the decision on research 
themes. We believe this model responds to two ra-
tionales: first, the wish of the public administration 
to gain some influence on project funding through 
the SNF; secondly, this joint management reduces 
the potential goal conflicts between these pro-
grammes and the general mission of the SNF, since 
the SNF is charged only with the evaluation of the 
scientific quality of the proposals, but not with the 
choice of the research themes. 
This arrangement might indicate that the stability 
and autonomy presupposes a relatively close co-
operation with Government in line with the Swiss 
consensus model of governance. On the other hand, 
the mission is definitely one of a science-based 
council operating mainly in a discipline-oriented 
manner and allocating funds to universities and, in 
line with this, it has been governed by a board of 
academics selected from the disciplines of higher-
education institutions. After inclusion of thematic or 
mission-oriented programmes, the council has suc-
ceeded in transforming these into the standard port-
folio of instruments, thus keeping to its mission and 
avoiding further governmental interference. 
Conclusions 
Our first research question concerned the respon-
siveness of the councils. From our material it is  
evident that research councils might be equally  
responsive to scientists and their institutions as to 
policy-makers, thus reducing the possibilities of im-
plementing science policy. In our study, the Austrian 
case is the clearest example of councils de facto con-
trolled by the beneficiaries, but also in the Norwegian 
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and Swiss cases the councils have negotiated their 
responses to government and managed to find solu-
tions, keeping their mission to the beneficiaries  
relatively unchanged despite policies towards the 
opposite. 
On the other hand, in the Austrian case since 
2004, we find evidence of councils being controlled 
directly by Government. In both the Austrian and 
Norwegian cases, we find examples of periods when 
ministries actually to some extent tried to avoid the 
use of councils, deliberately reducing the councils’ 
possibilities of playing a role in science policy. 
Our second question concerned the possible paral-
lel or homogeneous development of councils and 
their relation to government in the three countries. 
We find some homogeneity in the way that in all 
countries there has been a development of policies 
towards greater use of thematic and innovative  
funding instruments. On the other hand, the case 
studies have demonstrated that research councils 
play distinctly different roles in the countries we 
have examined; their roles have developed and 
changed in disparate ways over the years, as well as 
government to a varying degree exercising control 
over the councils. This is an indication of research 
councils basically being strongly embedded in  
national policies and national research systems. 
At a general level, our findings are illustrative of 
the limits of science policy. From government’s 
point of view, a research council might ideally be 
considered a loyal tool in the implementation of 
policies, but in real life we are more likely to find a 
situation where loyalties are mediated and modified 
by the necessary involvement of science. Since a  
research council without the involvement of scien-
tists probably will be even more counterproductive 
to the attainment of policy goals, the first alternative 
of policy-makers is to accept modifications to  
policy as an unavoidable transaction cost of policy 
implementation. 
On the other hand, we have also seen that, if 
councils’ responsiveness is not on a satisfactory 
level from policy-makers’ point of view, they might 
opt for the exit alternative, that is, more or less 
abandon councils as an instrument for science policy 
and interact directly with scientists. A third alterna-
tive is the possibility of accomplishing science poli-
cies by exercising direct power over councils against 
the wishes of science but, as long as the fulfilment of 
the final goals of policies — creating new knowl-
edge and innovation —has to be done by scientists, 
this is unlikely to be a useful policy for any long pe-
riod of time. 
From a theoretical point of view, our findings il-
lustrate the need for multidimensional concepts for 
analysing the functioning of research councils. The 
much used principal–agent approach captures essen-
tial features of how councils work, but might be in 
danger of not capturing adequately the councils’ 
complex embeddedness in the scientific and political 
system, or the factors affecting the responsiveness of 
councils. Introducing elements of organisation and 
system theory might thus supplement other  
approaches. 
Our findings also illustrate that the political and 
scientific systems can be partly de-coupled, and that 
the science system is able to act independently of 
government despite its dependencies for funding. We 
cannot from our case study generalise that policy 
modifications are likely to be found in other areas of 
science policy where intermediaries are involved but, 
from a methodological point of view, future studies 
could benefit from taking into account the possibility 
of modifications by stakeholders’ involvement. 
 
Notes 
1. Braun analyses the development of delegations as a direct re-
lationship between government and scientists, and without the 
use of intermediaries. We also find the typology useful for un-
derstanding how the relationship between research council 
and scientists has developed since the councils in this case 
can be understood as the extension of government. 
2. The study was undertaken by The European Network of Indi-
cator Producers (ENIP) 2004 funded by the PRIME Network of 
Excellence. It includes Austria, France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland (see Lepori et al, 
2006a; 2006b; Lepori, 2006a; Dinges, 2006; Potì and Reale, 
2006. 
3. We are splitting project-funding instruments into three catego-
ries: academic; thematic; and innovation. This is far from  
simple since a classification can use different criteria based on 
funding objectives and allocation criteria, as well as the differ-
ent types of research activity and beneficiary groups funded. 
See the cited papers for a detailed discussion. 
4. The ERP Fund was established under the Marshall Plan for 
European reconstruction and provided support for technology 
transfer and innovation projects close to market that require 
significant investments in the form of loans and guarantees 
(see Jörg, 2004). 
5. NORAS is omitted in analysis because if has been in exis-
tence only a short time (1987–1992). 
6. The FFG annual reports do not clearly distinguish between 
various sources of funds, which makes analysis of this case 
difficult. 
7. The Austrian Federal Economic Chamber WKÖ (15 mem-
bers), the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour AK (three 
members), the Austrian Federal Chamber of Agriculture (three 
members), and the Austrian Trade Union Federation ÖGB 
(three members). 
8. For instance, in 2002, when FFF was asked to administer the 
BMVIT Impulse Programmes. 
9. Factors such as the overall economic development and reallo-
cations between sectors can also influence this. 
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